The Birth of Military Industrialism in Bismarck’s Prussia
Did Military Industrialization Increase Chances of Success in War?
The start of the nineteenth century marked a turning point in the procedure of warfare between individual states across the international community. Evident by the Napoleonic wars (1803 to 1815), the deployment of an army could no longer be considered indispensable, but rather an expendable force that could now be gathered more efficiently because of conscription, and partly due to the emergence of nationalism. As a result, by the time Bismarck first took office in 1847, procedures of warfare had changed and the image of war as a ‘King’s sport’ was no more. Instead, many individual states now saw an increase in their military industry with new and effective strategies put in place to succeed in any conflicts that may arise. Such new steps in both domestic and foreign policy must be recognized as a new factor when considering success in conflict, but can we consider the military industrialization in Prussia to have increased the chances of her success throughout the Wars of German Unification? While we should also consider the expediency of Prussian foreign policy, I believe that we can state this answer to be true, because military industrialization allowed for policies of force multiplication with trained and disciplined troops, the rationalization of military organization by the Prussian General Staff, and a display of a national power attitude of the government and population that maintained military preparedness. Thus, military industrialization gave Prussia the power to achieve its aim of German reunification and increased the chances of success throughout different conflicts.
Indeed, military industrialization led to policies of force multiplication with trained and disciplined troops. The display of power by individual states has always been a key feature in international affairs, and it is this power that demonstrates “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do” (Nye & Welch 46). The reunification of Germany by 1871 was a national interest for Prussia, so the utilization of power was necessary to ‘get things done’. Bismarck wanted to isolate Austria from any German unification, so the outbreak of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War seemed a practical solution. “The question — Austria or Prussia — was one of power, not nationality,” however, so to increase one’s power, policies of force multiplication also seemed another practical solution (Breuilly 95). The strategy of such a policy “puts a great focus on amplifying the abilities of the individual soldier or unit in combat to achieve more than their counterpart” (Locke 2). Thus, technological and strategic advances of the Prussian military proceeded, to develop and exercise greater power across Europe.
An example of this was the development of the needle gun. Nineteenth-century warfare was “more reliant on the strategical manoeuvring of armies’’ due to the technological weaponry available: the flintlock musket and bayonet (Locke 12). Force multiplication had to therefore advance the technological capabilities of the Prussian army to outdo Austria, and the creation of the needle-gun fit with this idea. Unlike the muzzle-loading flintlock, the “needle gun operated with a manually rotated bolt” as a breech-loading rifle (Locke 44). Its rollout in the 1840s meant that by 1866, the Prussian army was readily equipped with breech-loading rifles inflicting “a casualty rate of five to one on the Austrians” (Locke 45). Breech-loading had ensured quicker reloading times to inflict a higher rate of injury or mortality, whereby after the Battle of Königgrätz, the Austrians were “so demoralized by the incessant fire of the needle rifle that their offices advised an immediate armistice” (Wawro 51). Ironically, however, was the French development of an improved needle gun: the Chassepot. The French breech-loading rifle gained an effective range of 1,000 yards to that of the Prussian’s 400 yards (Wawro 52). Nonetheless, the key point here is that Prussian military industrialization had not only advanced technology through force multiplication, but it had ensured well trained and disciplined troops that could fight efficiently on the battlefield. Prussian strategy and tactics would be performed “over and over ‘’ to “accelerate the process and increase pressure on the enemy” (Wawro 56). As such, by the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian army had an increased chance of success as a result of military industrialization because experienced troops made for a mass deployment when it was used well, despite the more efficient Chassepot rifle.
Second, military industrialization also led to the rationalization of military organization. Post-Napoleonic warfare had prescribed the existence of a full-time body — or General Staff — at the head of a state’s army. The existence of a general staff “is in effect the top executive’s alter ego” (Stanley 57). They are there to “bolster the army commander’s ability to oversee large-scale operations” and provide further military experience which may prove valuable (Stanley 59). The Prussian General Staff, then, were responsible for the study of warfare and consequent plans of mobilization and strategy. The existence of the Prussian General Staff system was so significant that it had to be outlawed for Germany and avoided by all democracies of Western Europe and of the West, for the efficiency of it was so great. Even the United States gained the visceral fear of a general staff due to the fear of military governance. Such an effective rationalization of military organisation created a “dualism of political and military authority in Prussia” and showed that military industrialization increased the chances of success in the Wars of German Unification (Pflanze 462).
Demonstrative of such a great concept was the efficient integration of railroad and military deployment, alongside a great mass of intelligence gathering. Composed of sixty prepared officers known for the precision and accuracy of intelligence and war-planning, Moltke’s General Staff were classified as a European phenomenon (Wawro 47). The German railroad was an asset of the empire and the army, because when the military were not using it, the general population could also ride it. For example, there were two tracks on either route creating an effective military deployment mechanism and soliciting a continuous plan of war even in times of peace. Military industrialism ensured Moltke’s diversion of military spending from traditional European fortresses to the mobilization of the army via railroad. Further, was the effective gathering of intelligence of France’s eastern forts and incomparable knowledge of the province of Alsace-Lorraine which was sandwiched between Germany and France. Through acquiring invaluable knowledge before the invasion, the General Staff ensured efficacious plans of attack and well-strategized deployment of Prussian troops. This combined with the asset of rail meant that the “Prussians would rush along five rail lines in three groups to ‘seek the enemy main force, find it and attack it’” (Wawro 48). As a result of military industrialization, the skillful deployment of the Prussian army through rationalized military organization was incredibly effective and ensured great success throughout the Wars of German Unification.
However, some people might argue that the expediency of Prussian foreign policy increased the chances of success during this period. Policies of dominance, isolation and consolidation all played a key role in Prussian foreign policy before and after the outbreak of war. Pflanze argues that “until the outbreak of war, diplomacy was paramount; thereafter, military necessity” (463). Political isolation of an individual state has to include uses of effective diplomacy between multiple states. One state must therefore exert policies of dominance to build up political alliances with others to impose a weakened position on an individual state. Only then, can the policy of consolidation to achieve diplomatic aims occur.
Evidence of this can be found in the run-up to both the 1866 and 1870–71 wars. When Prussia refused to aid Poland’s rebellion against Russia in 1863, Bismarck successfully opened a possible dialogue between the Russian state and Prussia to secure future cooperation. Likewise, in 1865 Bismarck promised Prussian support to Napoleon III in his plans to invade Belgium and gained support of Italy in aiding Prussia in any war that Austria was to instigate. The significance of this was twofold. First, it perpetrated the Austrians as aggressors, meaning an increase of Italian troops on the Austrian-Venetian border. Second, it demonstrated the effectiveness of expedient foreign policy to politically isolate Austria and win the 1866 war. Similarly, during the 1867 Luxembourg Crisis, “Bismarck displayed all of his legendary dexterity” and “stalled the French through the winter … when he was busy allying with the south German states … and rebuffed them at the very moment that the alliances were signed” (Wawro 22). Pflanze’s analogy of diplomacy being paramount should therefore be highly considered. However, military industrialisation had ensured the necessary requirements to follow through with foreign policy aims, and therefore solicited greater chances of success throughout the Wars of German Unification. Military preparedness was a key result of this, and a greater national power attitude of the government and population came into existence.
Third, then, was that military industrialization of Prussia led to greater military preparedness, maintained by an increased national attitude of the Prussian government and population to maintain their national power. For Morgenthau, “when we speak of the power or the foreign policy of a certain nation, we can only mean in empirical terms the power or the foreign policy of certain individuals who belong to the same nation” (73). Individuals within government must therefore be recognized as important factors when individual states shift their course to either a greater or lesser display of power across the international community. With the greater exertion of power came increased nationalism to the Prussian population, for consistent victory on the battlefield made a great case for an almighty powerful united Germany. The display of a state’s national power is maintained by many factors, yet Morgenthau stresses that military preparedness gives other factors like geography and industrial capacity their true importance for the power of a nation (88).
Prussian mobilization plans are no more evident in displaying Prussian military preparedness. Even before the War of 1866 broke out, Moltke had already devised plans and “constructed a precise timetable stretching forward seventy-five days … [which] include[d] the gathering of troops at their home stations; the entrainment of whole battalions … and their equipment” (Breuilly 159). This demonstrated the significance of government and population support, for the increased funding of the railroad had already ensured availability of drafting up plans in advance before any conflict arose. Government support was set in motion through key figures such as Bismarck and the Kaiser after increased military spending was made possible without monetary legislation through the Reichstag. Support from the population came due to the two-way efficiency of the railroad. By maintaining the ready-able use of railroad for state citizens, it seemed reasonable that any taxation or further increased spending for the purpose of the military would also benefit the population via greater infrastructure. Thus, military preparedness as a result of military industrialization, effectively increased the chances of success throughout the Wars of German Unification, because of the mass support gained both in government and population for the maintenance of a great display of national power.
It is conclusively evident that military industrialization increased the chance of success of Prussia in the Wars of German Unification. Military industrialism gives states the power to achieve and successfully implement their aims. Thus, policies of force multiplication to obtain a higher number of well trained and disciplined troops, the rationalization of Prussian military organization, and a display of a national power attitude of the government and population that maintained military preparedness were all made possible. Such an instance of military industrialization mattered because it was a revolutionary way to develop and exercise power. Prior to the Wars of German Unification, Napoleon had already established one revolutionary concept through the policy of conscription. Now, within the same century, Bismarck and Prussia had established another one. Yet another revolution within the war formula had emerged, and it is this formula that keeps getting repeated into our time, over and over again.
Bibliography:
- Breuilly, John. Austria, Prussia and the Making of Germany : 1806 -1871. Pearson Education Limited, 2017.
- Locke, Samuel A. Multiplying an Army: Prussian and German Military Planning and the Concept of Force Multiplication in Three Conflicts. May 2020.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, A.A. Knopf, 1948.
- Nye, Joseph S, and David A Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation : An Introduction to Theory and History. Boston, Pearson, 2017.
- Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany. [1]. The Period of Unification, 1815–1871. Princeton, Nj Princeton Univ. Press, 1963.
- Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War the German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge Cambridge Univ. Pr, 2010.
